Charles Larmore together with John Rawls is among the pioneers of the idea of political liberalism for a summary of his earlier view, see here. What emerges out the wake of this process of collapse —in the 16th and 17th century —was a new problem for justifying political authority: namely, the fact that reasonable people disagree about the good. Political liberalism opts for the second path. Or, perhaps, when peers disagree, people ought to backtrack and recant their original views.
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Charles Larmore together with John Rawls is among the pioneers of the idea of political liberalism for a summary of his earlier view, see here. What emerges out the wake of this process of collapse —in the 16th and 17th century —was a new problem for justifying political authority: namely, the fact that reasonable people disagree about the good.
Political liberalism opts for the second path. Or, perhaps, when peers disagree, people ought to backtrack and recant their original views. Larmore thinks these ways of tackling reasonable disagreement are confused. One must, in some way, decide. The key, though, is the issue of justification. Reasonable views are justified views; they need not all be true. Lamore then puts forward a contextualist-pragmatist view of justification.
Framing the issue this way allows us to see that responding to reasonable disagreement in the way that political liberalism does requires a moral justification. The Problem Part 2: Coercion The problem, though, is not just that people reasonably disagree. On many matters, we may simply agree to disagree. But this raises the question under what condition is coercion legitimate? But what justifies this claim? For, although the person might accept the principle under threat of coercion, she would not be able to be moved by the reason for imposing the rule.
Thus, Larmore thinks, the principle of respect provides the basis for a liberal principle of legitimacy: political principles must be as justifiable to others from their perspective as they are to us.
More precisely: The fundamental principles of political society, being coercive in nature, ought to be such that all who are to be subject to them must be able from their perspective to see reason to endorse them on the assumption —perhaps counterfactual [sic. The underlying principle here respect for persons is, of course, not likely to be endorsed by everyone. Implications Having outlined this view, Larmore sketches some of its implications. First, it is not the goal of political liberalism to show that all people can generally endorse its defining principles.
It does not have a merely political validity; it must be seen as independently binding although Larmore does not say, explicitly, how this norm is to be grounded. Third, the principle of respect defines the nature of the consensus we seek.
The idea of respect is what requires a search for common ground. It thus sets limits on consensus, and suggests that its nature is hypothetical: the norms citizens would accept, were they reasonable and committed to the norm of respect.
Fourth, it will not do to object to political liberalism that it too is a subject of reasonable disagreement. The point is that political principles must be acceptable to parties who endorse the norm of respect for persons.
Fifth, the idea of respect applies only to fundamental principles of justice. Not all issues are settled, and policy decision may still be a matter of disagreement. It may, in a way, counterfactually include Prospects What of the prospect of this idea? The future for political liberalism, Larmore notes, is uncertain and, just as earlier forms of classical liberalism could not meet the challenges of their times, perhaps political liberalism cannot meet its challenges.
But, that assumption is perhaps no longer justified, given the increasing globalization of international capitalism. Share this:.
What is its guiding spirit? One can call this ideal neutrality, if one bears in mind two facts: 1 that the neutrality in question is neutrality with respect to controversial views of the good life, not to morality as such; 2 that such neutrality ought to be justified without appeal to controversial to conceptions of the good. Neutrality is not skepticism—the primary motivation is not epistemological but moral. This raises the question: how should neutrality be justified? This strategy Larmore terms individualism and he attributes it to Kant and Mill.
He has also published extensively on figures and problems in the history of philosophy, particularly in the area of 17th century philosophy and on German Idealism, as well as on the nature of reason and reasons. He is currently at work on a book about the nature of freedom. Research Statement In recent years, Charles Larmore has published work primarily on three topics in the area of moral and political philosophy. The first has to do with the foundations of political liberalism, and particularly with the nature of the principles by which a liberal political order can hope to respect the equal worth of each individual citizen while remaining neutral with regard to their differing conceptions of the human good. A second topic has to do with the nature of the self, and the focus has been on the nature of the relation we have inescapably to ourselves in virtue of which we are selves at all; Larmore has argued that this self-relation is not one of self-knowledge or self-awareness, as philosophers have often assumed, but instead an essentially practical relation of being committed to thinking and acting in accord with the presumed truth of what we believe and the presumed value of what we desire. Funded Research.
CHARLES LARMORE POLITICAL LIBERALISM PDF
Shatilar Political Liberalism Sign in Create an account. Young — Editor Price: Request removal from index. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines — religious, philosophical, and moral — coexist within the framework of democratic institutions.